Classical Psychology: Other Faculties?

In classical thought, the soul has certain faculties, as identified by distinct psychological activities/capacities. The three most commonly discussed faculties, found in writings at least as ancient as Plato, are the intellect, affections, and will. (Sometimes these same three faculties are discussed under different terms.) But should these three faculties be understood as exhaustive? Are there psychological activities/capacities that clearly belong in another category?

In De Trinitate, Augustine seems to identify the memory as a distinct faculty of the soul. Other classical writers seem to include the imagination (sometimes called "fancy") as a distinct faculty. Memory and imagination seem to involve a different activity than the apprehension of knowledge; thus, they seem to be different than the intellect. Though emotions may be involved in memories or imagination, the formation of mental images seem to involve a different faculty than the affections. Though a person may make choices (or at least strive to make choices) about what to remember or imagine, the will seems to be a different faculty from the capacity by which a person remembers or imagines. On the other hand, memory and imagination do seem closely connected; both involve the creation of non-corporeal (or not presently corporeal) images/sensations in the mind, although memory (when functioning properly) involves actual perceived events and imagination usually involves fictional beings or situations.

Also, I recently had someone suggest to me the conscience may be a distinct faculty, as internal warnings and convictions concerning situations involving guilt seem to involve an activity of the soul distinct from those previously discussed.

Careful thought is needed concerning these matters, if one seeks to have a robust view of the soul according to a classical understanding.

Classical Psychology: Will/Heart

In classical thought, the soul has certain faculties, as identified by distinct psychological activities/capacities. One of these is termed the will, which is classically associated with the heart. The action of the will is properly called desire, volition, or appetition; desire seeks out two basic kinds of ends according to lower/sense appetites or higher/rational appetites.

I. Lower or sense appetites are concerned with basic physical needs:
A. Food and water;
B. Clothing;
C. Shelter.

II. Higher or rational appetites are concerned with the good (in a moral sense):
A. Truth;
B. Beauty;
C. Unity.

Classical Psychology: Affections/Emotions/Feelings/Soul

In classical thought, the soul has certain faculties, as identified by distinct psychological activities/capacities. One of these is termed the affections (also known as "emotions," "feelings," or simply the "soul" [as in: 'mind, heart, and soul'], and classically associated with the belly or bowels). This is the faculty by which the soul is moved to give assent (assensus) to the good and to reject evil. Actions of the affections/soul are called affections, emotions, feelings, or [often negatively] passions. (Notice the difficulty in terminology here: either the faculty and actions go by the same name ["affections"] or else the faculty is designated "soul," which term may create confusion since the soul is also the name for the immaterial part of Man, comprised of distinct faculties ['mind, heart, soul,' etc.].) Using "affections" and "emotion" synonymously, note the following, on how the activities of the affections are related to the intellect:

A.    “Affections in the general are these movings of the rational soul [the intellect], whereby the heart is sensibly carried out upon good or evil; so as to embrace the one, or refuse the other.”[1]

B.    “Emotion is a pleasurable or painful tone which may accompany the exercise of both sensuous and rational powers [the lower and higher activities of the intellect]”

1.“Pleasure is the concomitant of the healthy and normal exercise of any of our powers.”

2.  “Pain [or passion] is the concomitant of either the excessive or the inadequate or inhibited exercise of any of our powers.”[2]

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[1] William Bridge, Bridge’s Remains, Being VIII Sermons (London: Printed by John Hancock, 1673), 26.

[2] Sister Miriam Joseph, The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric (Philadelphia: Printed by Paul Dry Books, 2002), 45.

Classical Psychology: Intellect/Understanding/Mind

In classical thought, the soul has certain faculties, as identified by distinct psychological activities/capacities. One of these is the intellect (sometimes termed the "understanding" or the "mind"): the faculty by which the soul apprehends knowledge (notitia). The action of the intellect is properly called cognition, of which there are two basic kinds.

1. Lower or sensuous cognition, which is understood in terms of immediate sense perception [of empirical data], and which produces percepts [defined as basic mental concepts apprehended as a consequence of the process of lower cognition].
2. Higher or rational cognition, which is understood in terms of logically ordering percepts, and which produces concepts.