Classical Psychology: Other Faculties?

In classical thought, the soul has certain faculties, as identified by distinct psychological activities/capacities. The three most commonly discussed faculties, found in writings at least as ancient as Plato, are the intellect, affections, and will. (Sometimes these same three faculties are discussed under different terms.) But should these three faculties be understood as exhaustive? Are there psychological activities/capacities that clearly belong in another category?

In De Trinitate, Augustine seems to identify the memory as a distinct faculty of the soul. Other classical writers seem to include the imagination (sometimes called "fancy") as a distinct faculty. Memory and imagination seem to involve a different activity than the apprehension of knowledge; thus, they seem to be different than the intellect. Though emotions may be involved in memories or imagination, the formation of mental images seem to involve a different faculty than the affections. Though a person may make choices (or at least strive to make choices) about what to remember or imagine, the will seems to be a different faculty from the capacity by which a person remembers or imagines. On the other hand, memory and imagination do seem closely connected; both involve the creation of non-corporeal (or not presently corporeal) images/sensations in the mind, although memory (when functioning properly) involves actual perceived events and imagination usually involves fictional beings or situations.

Also, I recently had someone suggest to me the conscience may be a distinct faculty, as internal warnings and convictions concerning situations involving guilt seem to involve an activity of the soul distinct from those previously discussed.

Careful thought is needed concerning these matters, if one seeks to have a robust view of the soul according to a classical understanding.