Penal Substitutionary Atonement: Critique of a Critique (Part 5)

[UPDATE 9/30: A conversation with my brother-in-law on Facebook concerning this post is (I hope) helping me to clarify some statements that may have been ill-communicated below. Readers who have "friended" me on Facebook are encouraged to view that conversation.]

In Green & Baker's fourth paragraph against Charles Hodge's presentation of penal substitutionary atonement, they argue against the idea that a substitute must pay the penalty for a sinner in order for that sinner to experience the benefits of atonement. To this end, Green & Baker utilize Robin Collins’ illustration of how Collins claims the story of the Prodigal Son must be changed if penal substitutionary atonement is true:

When the son returns and recognizes the error of his ways, Collins has the Father respond, “I cannot simply forgive you… it would be against the moral order of the entire universe… Such is the severity of my justice that reconciliation will not be made unless the penalty is utterly paid. My wrath– my avenging justice– must be placated.”

The above illustration assumes that no penalty is paid for the son’s sin in the parable, and that the Father in the parable “simply forgive[s]” the son. (As if true forgiveness for great offenses– like those committed by the son– is a ever a ‘simple’ matter.)

It is true that penal substitution (or any other particular model of the atonement) is not explicit in this parable. As John MacArthur notes in his great book on the parable, A Tale of Two Sons:

Notice that Jesus did not mention anything about the actual means of atonement in the parable of the prodigal son. That, after all, wasn’t the point of the story. But our Lord did nevertheless directly confront the heart of the Pharisees’ error, which was their insistence that all sinners need to perform certain works to atone for their own sin– and thus earn the forgiveness and favor of God. (123)

Through careful analysis of this parable, MacArthur also demonstrates that a kind of substitution was, in fact, made. The Father in this parable runs to the returning Prodigal, which would have been considered extremely undignified in his culture; the Father embraces and kisses the Prodigal, thus taking on himself the uncleanness (physical and ceremonial) that the Prodigal had from living with swine; the Father, in a culture that demanded a man seek restitution from those who had wronged him, freely forgave the Prodigal. In all of the actions just mentioned, the Father took shame upon himself– shame that the Prodigal alone deserved– while granting the Prodigal forgiveness. Also, remember, that the Father suffered loss from the Prodigal when the Father had to pay out the Prodigal’s inheritance before its time, but the Prodigal did not have to go on suffering the poverty he incurred due to wasting away his inheritance– rather, he is restored into the family with full rights and privileges.

So the idea that the Father forgives the Prodigal without suffering on behalf of the Prodigal is ludicrous. Robin Collins is no more accurate in his reading of Jesus’ parable than Green & Baker are in their reading of Hodges’ Theology.

Penal Substitutionary Atonement: Critique of a Critique (Part 4)

Again, from Green & Baker's third paragraph against Charles Hodge's presentation of penal substitutionary atonement:

Within a penal substitution model, God's ability to love and relate to humans is circumscribed by something outside of God- that is, an abstract concept of justice instructs God as to how God must behave.

With the above statement, Green & Baker present their readers with a straw man. If Charles Hodge and others who hold to penal substitutionary atonement actually argued that God is "circumscribed by something outside of God," then the "penal substitution model" would OBVIOUSLY be false for the Bible clearly teaches that NOTHING is greater than God.

In studying Charles Hodge's actual writings about the justice of God (from a section of his Systematic Theology titled "Satisfaction Rendered to Justice") it becomes clear that the justice that informs God's actions and with which sinners must deal is not an "abstract concept" but comes about due to God's own character. For God is a just God and has revealed His own intention to reward the righteous and punish the wicked- this is not something that is forced upon God from outside, but is in accordance with His own will.

In order to both fulfill the intention just mentioned above- to reward the righteous and punish the wicked- and to also fulfill His intention to save sinners, God provides a righteous substitute who takes the punishment due to the wicked and who covers the wicked in His own righteousness, thereby saving sinners. This act of salvation in Christ is, again, not something imposed on God, but which flows from His own purposes and character.

Penal Substitutionary Atonement: Critique of a Critique (Part 3)

From Green & Baker's third paragraph against Charles Hodge's presentation of penal substitutionary atonement:

Rather than presenting a Father and Son who are one, Hodge has one member of the Trinity punishing another member of the Trinity.

In my last post, I basically raised the question of whether Green & Baker might be committing a false-cause fallacy, because upon observing similarities between the Western criminal justice system and traditional Evangelical explanations of God's justice, they consistently assert that the traditional Evangelical explanations of God's justice are shaped (and distorted) by the Western criminal justice system.

In the above quote the authors present their readers with a false dilemma: EITHER the Father and Son are one OR the Father punished the Son.

Hodge's presentation of the Covenant of Redemption contains BOTH of the above ideas; of the Covenant of Remdemption, Hodge writes:

There is only one God, one divine Being, to whom all the attributes of divinity belong. But in the Godhead there are three persons, the same in substance, and equal in power and glory. It lies in the nature of personality, that one person is objective to another. If therefore, the Father and the Son are distinct persons the one be the object of the acts of the other. The one may love, address, and commune with the other. The Father may send the Son, may give Him a work to do, and promise Him a recompense. All this is indeed incomprehensible to us, but being clearly taught in Scripture, it must enter into the Christian’s faith.

The Father and the Son are one God AND the Father punished the Son (who willingly took the punishment that we deserved upon Himself): "the punishment that brought our peace was upon Him... it was the LORD's will to crush him and cause him to suffer" (Isaiah 53:5;10).

Penal Substitutionary Atonement: Critique of a Critique (Part 2)

Green & Baker's second paragraph against Charles Hodge's presentation of penal substitutionary atonement:

Because Hodge read the Bible through the lens of the criminal justice system of his era, the Bible appeared to support his explanation. In other words, if readers come to the biblical text with the presuppositions Hodge has about justice, God's wrath and judgment, and the mechanics of biblical sacrifice, then indeed his model seems biblical. If, however, we attempt to allow the Bible itself to shape the way we think about those same terms, his model appears fundamentally flawed because it operates with an understanding of these terms that is foreign to the Bible.

In other posts I hope to further examine whether Hodge's understanding of the issues raised above- "justice, God's wrath and judgment, and the mechanics of biblical sacrifice"- is indeed biblical; obviously, Hodge thought he was being biblical whereas Green & Baker disagree.

In this post, I would like to simple raise a question never addressed by Green & Baker in their presentation.

When Green & Baker see similarities in God's justice according to traditional Evangelical interpretation and the Western criminal justice system, they consistently attribute this similarity to an influence of the Western understanding of criminal justice upon biblical exegesis that is illegitimate, at least in our post-modern age. What they never seem to consider is the following question: What if the traditional understanding of criminal justice in the West was actually influenced by the biblical presentation of God's justice? In other words, if the Western criminal justice system was actually shaped by a biblical understanding of justice, might the similarities between the criminal justice system and the traditional Evangelical interpretation of God's justice be legitimate after all?

Penal Substitutionary Atonement: Critique of a Critique (Part 1)

In my critique of Green & Baker's attack on penal substitutionary atonement, I will focus on their assessment of Charles Hodge's teaching on this subject. The following paragraph is from page 146 of Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament & Contemporary Contexts by Joel B. Green & Mark D. Baker:

At the heart of Hodge's explanation of the atonement is a legal metaphor that would have been readily understood by people of his era. That may be less true today with the dissolution of an accepted framework of universal moral law. Hodge also, however, leans heavily on the biblical image of blood sacrifice, something very distant from his students in nineteenth-century New Jersey. His concern does not appear to be to develop a presentation that will connect with people's reality but to articulate a logical, intellectually sound, and biblically correct theory of the atonement. He cites many scriptural passages to support his explanations, thus at least giving his position the appearance of being biblical. Upon closer examination, however, we find that Hodge's model actually falls short in this regard.

Green & Baker first criticize Hodge's "explanation of the atonement" (i.e., penal substitutionary atonement) by calling into question two concepts "at the heart" of a penal substitutionary understanding of the atonement, namely: "universal moral law" and "blood sacrifice." Green & Baker are correct in identifying these concepts as fundamental to penal substitutionary atonement, for "penal" indicates the death penalty incurred by humanity for breaking God's "universal moral law" and "substitutionary" indicates that one life may be substituted for another in accordance with a system of "blood sacrifice."

Green & Baker are also correct to point out that the concept of "universal moral law" may be less readily understood by people today than in the past.

What Green & Baker fail to mention is that the concept of "universal moral law" is a thoroughly biblical idea (they give the impression that "universal moral law" was invented by 'modernists'). Psalm 119:160 declares, "All your words are true, all your righteous laws are eternal" (NIV); in Matthew 5:18 Jesus says, "I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished" (NIV). This everlasting Law is not merely an artifact in a museum, but as Psalm 19 makes clear, it is vitally involved in "reviving the soul" "making wise the simple" as well as in warning against sins.

While Green & Baker (rightly) label "blood sacrifice" as "biblical," they apparently believe that the concept of "blood sacrifice" is dispensable and that other concepts may be used instead of "blood sacrifice" to communicate about the atonement in cultures that do not have experience with a sacrificial system. The idea that "blood sacrifice" may be dispensable only makes since after the idea of "universal moral law" has been rejected- if people do not stand under condemnation for breaking a "universal moral law," then they do not need the God-ordained means- the biblical blood sacrifice- for re-establishing a right relationship with God in light of their law-breaking.

When we lose the concept of "blood sacrifice," as biblically developed, we lose vital knowledge about who Jesus is and what He has done for sinners. Without "blood sacrifice" we cannot understand John's declaration that Jesus is the "Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world" (John 1:29). Without "blood sacrifice" we cannot understand the presentation of Hebrews that Jesus is our great High Priest who offers his own blood for our redemption (Heb 9:11-14). Without "blood sacrifice" we cannot the vision in Revelation of Jesus as a "Lamb looking as if it had been slain" who is praised because with His blood He purchased men for God (Rev 5).

Penal Substitutionary Atonement: Critique of a Critique (Introduction)

When I first began thinking about coming to the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, my pastor at the time warned me that seminary education can often involve reading more attacks against Christian faith than edifying reflections on the Word of God, and thus time at seminary can, if one is not careful, leave one spiritually drained rather than enriched. Thankfully, my teachers here have seemed aware of this reality and the great majority of my textbooks have been enlightening and beneficial. For the sake of academic integrity and due to the desire to accurately represent various viewpoints, we do occasionally have to read material that attacks a core doctrine or doctrines of our faith. In this vein, one book I'm required to read this semester is Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament & Contemporary Contexts by Joel B. Green & Mark D. Baker. Despite its promising title this book is an extended attack on the doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement.

The doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement is the teaching that the Lord Jesus Christ died in our place to pay the penalty of our sin and bring us into a right relationship to God. J.I. Packer describes this doctrine as follows:

The notion which the phrase 'penal substitution' expresses is that Jesus Christ our Lord, moved by a love that was determined to do everything necessary to save us, endured and exhausted the destructive divine judgment for which we were otherwise inescapably destined, and so won us forgiveness, adoption, and glory.

In my next few posts, I plan to look carefully at Green & Baker's critique of this doctrine and to offer a response.

Nationalized Healthcare? (Part 5): Better than nothing?

One argument made by those who support the healthcare reform bill currently before Congress- or some variation thereof- is that if this legislation does not pass quickly, the call for healthcare reform will be stifled and NO healthcare reform will take place. The argument is that even if there may be some legitimate disagreements with certain aspects of the proposed legislation, the problems in healthcare are so serious that SOMETHING must be done, and that passing something like H.R. 3200 is certainly batter than doing nothing.

But is such a bill 'better than nothing'? I would argue "no" for 4 main reasons: 1. Such legislation would make the government too involved in providing healthcare, and such a function is not proper to the role of government; 2. The bill currently before Congress has no provision forbidding tax dollars being used for abortion, and based on precedent, this would mean that the bill would make it so that taxpayers would end up funding abortions; 3. Statements made by the Obama administration about how healthcare would be rationed under the current proposals are extremely troubling, especially for me, as my step-father-in-law was recently cured of leukemia through medical intervention- I have doubts as to whether such treatment would have been available to him in a nationalized healthcare system; 4. Current proposals before Congress are fiscally irresponsible and would lead to skyrocketing national debt, which would have dire consequences for the future of our country.

But we should not settle for the false dichotomy of "Obama's plan" [or the plan of any one government official] or "nothing." There are better options being discussed, and it is the duty of every responsible voter not only to let our Congress-people know that we oppose bills like H.R. 3200, but that we also will not settle for the status quo- that in the name of justice, the government must see that RESPONSIBLE health care reform does take place.

Nationalized Healthcare? (Part 4): Wise regulation as a part of the solution

There is a stream of thought within conservative political philosophy that is suspicious of any government regulation of businesses. But whereas we should carefully consider the proper limits to the government (as previously discussed on this blog), and should challenge the government to not go beyond these limits, the role of government as one that preserves justice by prohibiting, preventing, prosecuting, and punishing injustice cannot be limited to private individuals but must extend to the actions of corporations as well. As the founding fathers of our country, recognizing the sinfulness of Man as taught in the Bible, set up a system of checks and balances within the government so that power could not be consolidated within one branch of government, leading to despotism, so the government itself must at times provide a check against corporations or industries, which are also led and managed by sinful individuals, and which can execute grave injustices against the national population.

To give an example of proper government regulation of private corporations: consider the Food and Drug Administration. When the industrial revolution fully impacted agriculture and food became mass-produced and marketed not just regionally, but nationally, some corporations began taking advantage of the situation and they began putting all kinds of non-food "fillers" in the ingredients of the food-stuffs they were marketing. (When earning my history degree, I remember reading an old newspaper article printed during the time when government regulation of food production was being debated; those supporting such regulation wrote a poem that started with the line, "Things aren't always what they seem, they give us paste instead of cream.") Few today would argue that there should be no FDA and that the government should keep its hands off the food industry: people are too worried about eating tubercular beef or paste in their cream to make such arguments.

Government regulation, wisely done, may be an important part of resolving the healthcare concerns that confront our nation. Government regulation may take the form of antitrust investigations and litigation against insurance companies in some markets. Government regulation would certainly address the problem of "rescissions," or retroactive denials of healthcare coverage by which people pay for insurance they never receive.

The kind of government regulation that I am attempting to argue for could be done through the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice; it would not necessarily involve the creation of a new regulatory agency. I believe that such regulation could address many of the concerns people have without anything like the massive increase in debt that would be incurred in the current plan before Congress, and I think that such regulation takes seriously the proper role of government as the administrator of justice.